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Last analyzed 8/13/2026

Language Model Security Database

969 research findings · 1102 evaluated models

Latest research findings

969 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A black-box guardrail reverse-engineering vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems that employ output filtering mechanisms. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to replicate the proprietary decision-making policy and rule sets of the target's safety guardrail without direct access to model parameters. This is achieved through a technique termed Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack (GRA), which utilizes a reinforcement learning framework combined with genetic…

Black-Box Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that combines image typography manipulation with multi-turn prompting. The vulnerability exploits the model's visual encoder and instruction-following capabilities by embedding a harmful textual query directly into a benign image as a visible caption (using specific fonts and blending techniques). An attacker then engages the model in a three-turn conversation: first asking a benign question about the visual object…

Jailbreaking Large Vision Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2 7B, LLaVA 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/1/2025

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning process of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for the automated generation of stealthy backdoor attacks using an autonomous LLM agent. This method, termed AutoBackdoor, creates a pipeline to generate semantically coherent trigger phrases and corresponding poisoned instruction-response pairs. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that rely on fixed, often anomalous triggers, this technique produces natural language triggers that are contextually relevant and…

AutoBackdoor: Automating Backdoor Attacks via LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) from multiple vendors exhibit vulnerabilities to jailbreaking techniques that bypass safety guardrails, enabling the automated generation of highly persuasive phishing content specifically targeted at elderly victims. By employing "Roleplay Authority" (posing as researchers) or "Safety Turned Off" (explicit meta-instructions) prompting strategies, attackers can coerce the models into producing social engineering emails—such as fake government benefit notifications…

Can AI Models be Jailbroken to Phish Elderly Victims? An End-to-End Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, LLaMA-2-13B, Mistral-7B, and Phi-3.5-mini, are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) adversarial prompt injections that undermine factual recall. Termed the "$\chi$mera" (Chimera) attack framework, this vulnerability exists when an attacker intercepts and modifies user queries (e.g., via malicious browser extensions, compromised frontends, or proxy middleware) before they reach the victim model. By appending adversarial…

Injecting Falsehoods: Adversarial Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Undermining Factual Recall in LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Mistral 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-3.5-turbo, LLaMA3-8B-instruct, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B, are vulnerable to a "Self-Harm" jailbreak attack (Self-HarmLLM). This vulnerability exploits the model's ability to understand its own safety boundaries to generate adversarial inputs against itself. An attacker utilizes a two-session approach: in the first session (Mitigation Session), the attacker instructs the model to rewrite a harmful query into a "Mitigated Harmful Query"…

Self-HarmLLM: Can Large Language Model Harm Itself?
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 8B Instruct, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/5/2025

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.