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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Evolutionary Language Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be exploited by the FORGEDAN evolutionary framework to bypass safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack, which operates in a black-box setting, uses a genetic algorithm to automatically evolve effective jailbreak prompts. The framework combines multi-strategy textual perturbations (at the character, word, and sentence levels) with a semantic fitness function based on RoBERTa embeddings. This allows it to iteratively…

FORGEDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemma 2 9B, Qwen 2.5 7B+2 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • RoBERTa
  • Transpec 13B

ITS Typography Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that combines image typography manipulation with multi-turn prompting. The vulnerability exploits the model's visual encoder and instruction-following capabilities by embedding a harmful textual query directly into a benign image as a visible caption (using specific fonts and blending techniques). An attacker then engages the model in a three-turn conversation: first asking a benign question about the visual object…

Jailbreaking Large Vision Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2 7B, LLaVA 7B

Black-Box Graph-Text Node Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) feature encoders with graph message-passing architectures, are vulnerable to a black-box node injection attack known as "GraphTextack." This vulnerability exists because the joint model architecture creates a dual attack surface: the GNN component is sensitive to structural perturbations (changes in graph topology), while the LLM component is sensitive to semantic perturbations (adversarial phrasing).

GRAPHTEXTACK: A Realistic Black-Box Node Injection Attack on LLM-Enhanced GNNs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

EvoSynth: Evolutionary Attack Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel class of jailbreak attacks generated through the evolutionary synthesis of executable, code-based attack algorithms. Unlike traditional methods that refine or combine static prompts, this technique uses an automated multi-agent system (EvoSynth) to autonomously engineer and evolve the underlying code that generates the attack. These generated algorithms exhibit high structural and dynamic complexity, using features like control flow, state…

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, GPT-4o+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Qwen Max

MAS Pipeline Weak Links

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Centralized Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) architectures, specifically those implemented using frameworks such as Magentic-One, LangGraph, and OpenAI Agents, contain design-level vulnerabilities facilitating safety alignment bypasses. Two primary mechanisms drive this vulnerability: 1. Context Fragmentation via Atomic Delegation: The orchestrator decomposes adversarial prompts into atomic, granular sub-tasks (e.g., "click button," "write function header") before delegating them to sub-agents. These…

Exposing Weak Links in Multi-Agent Systems under Adversarial Prompting
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

LLM Elder Fraud Pipeline

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) from multiple vendors exhibit vulnerabilities to jailbreaking techniques that bypass safety guardrails, enabling the automated generation of highly persuasive phishing content specifically targeted at elderly victims. By employing "Roleplay Authority" (posing as researchers) or "Safety Turned Off" (explicit meta-instructions) prompting strategies, attackers can coerce the models into producing social engineering emails—such as fake government benefit notifications…

Can AI Models be Jailbroken to Phish Elderly Victims? An End-to-End Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro+3 more
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 4
  • DeepSeek Chat V3.1
  • Llama 4 Maverick

Linguistic Style Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Linguistic Style Jailbreaks, a technique where an attacker reframes a harmful prompt using specific linguistic tones—such as politeness, fear, curiosity, or compassion—to bypass safety guardrails. While standard safety alignment (RLHF) effectively filters harmful requests phrased in neutral or hostile tones, it fails to generalize to prompts where the semantic intent remains harmful but the stylistic framing triggers compliant, helpful, or…

Say It Differently: Linguistic Styles as Jailbreak Vectors
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+13 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Ministral 8B Instruct 2410
  • Phi-4 Mini Instruct
  • Command R+
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Grok 4

Speech-Audio Composition Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing speech and audio are vulnerable to Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks. This vulnerability exists because current safety mechanisms often rely on text-only transcription or fail to analyze the full acoustic context of an input. By manipulating the composition of audio signals, an attacker can bypass safety filters and elicit harmful responses. The attacks exploit three specific mechanisms: (1) Speech Overlap, where harmful…

Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks on Multimodal LLMs and Their Defense with SALMONN-Guard
Evaluated models: Qwen2-Audio 7B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Step-Audio 2 Mini Base+6 more
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Step-Audio 2 Mini Base
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6 8B
  • Qwen3-Omni 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Kimi-Audio 7B Instruct
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

LAM Speech Style Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.