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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Research findings

985 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Symbolic Math Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, termed "MathPrompt," which leverages the models' ability to process symbolic mathematics to bypass built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful natural language prompts into mathematically formulated problems, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs while ostensibly solving a mathematical problem.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Symbolic Mathematics
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+10 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash (block None)
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro (block None)
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

RAG Worm Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

Adaptive Position Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AdaPPA is a jailbreak attack that exploits the varying levels of alignment protection in LLMs at different output positions. It leverages the model's instruction-following capabilities by pre-filling the output with carefully crafted "safe" content, creating a perceived completion and lowering the model's guard before generating malicious content. The attack's effectiveness relies on the adaptive generation of both safe and harmful pre-fill content, strategically placed to exploit weaknesses…

AdaPPA: Adaptive Position Pre-Fill Jailbreak Attack Approach Targeting LLMs
Evaluated models: ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+5 more
  • ChatGLM3 6B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Single-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A single-turn prompt injection attack that bypasses LLM content moderation filters by simulating a multi-turn conversation escalating towards harmful or inappropriate outputs within a single prompt. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to maintain context and continue established patterns, even when leading to undesirable content.

Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+4 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Attack LLMs with Toxic Answers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Random Token T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A heuristic token search attack, termed HTS-Attack, can bypass safety mechanisms in text-to-image (T2I) models, allowing generation of NSFW content. The attack iteratively replaces tokens in a malicious prompt with semantically similar tokens from the model's vocabulary, avoiding detection by prompt and image checkers. The method leverages a surrogate CLIP model to maintain semantic similarity to the target NSFW prompt.

Rt-attack: Jailbreaking text-to-image models via random token
Evaluated models: Clip-vit-base-patch32, DALL-E 3, GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct+4 more
  • Clip-vit-base-patch32
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct
  • Safegen
  • Sld
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion v1.5

LLM Adversarial Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, ECLIPSE, which leverages the LLM's own capabilities as an optimizer to generate adversarial suffixes. ECLIPSE iteratively refines these suffixes based on a harmfulness score, bypassing the need for pre-defined affirmative phrases used in previous optimization-based attacks. This allows for effective jailbreaking even with limited interaction and without white-box access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Unlocking Adversarial Suffix Optimization Without Affirmative Phrases: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking via LLM as Optimizer
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Adversarial Unlearning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing gradient-ascent based unlearning methods are vulnerable to a dynamic unlearning attack (DUA). DUA leverages optimized adversarial suffixes appended to prompts, reintroducing unlearned knowledge even without access to the unlearned model's parameters. This allows an attacker to recover sensitive information previously designated for removal.

Towards robust knowledge unlearning: An adversarial framework for assessing and improving unlearning robustness in large language models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Carrier Article Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack that leverages "neural carrier articles." This attack injects a prohibited query into a benign article generated by a secondary LLM, designed to be semantically similar to the prohibited query but not trigger the primary LLM's safety mechanisms. The secondary LLM generates articles based on hypernyms derived from the prohibited query, thus subtly shifting attention weights within the primary LLM, bypassing its safeguards.

Hide Your Malicious Goal Into Benign Narratives: Jailbreak Large Language Models through Neural Carrier Articles
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B

LCCT Data Extraction & Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs), such as GitHub Copilot and Amazon Q, are vulnerable to jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks due to their unique workflows and reliance on proprietary code datasets. Jailbreaking attacks exploit the LLM's ability to generate harmful content by embedding malicious prompts within various code components (filenames, comments, variable names, function calls). Training data extraction attacks leverage the LLM's tendency to…

Security Attacks on LLM-based Code Completion Tools
Evaluated models: GPT 3.5-turbo-0125, GPT-4 Turbo-2024-04-09, GPT-4o-2024-05-13

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.