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LMVD-ID: ef722a3d
Paper published July 1, 2024
Entry analyzed March 4, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Progressive Red Teaming Framework

The Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT) framework exploits vulnerabilities in large language models (LLMs) by iteratively generating adversarial prompts. APRT uses an Intention Expanding LLM to generate diverse…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B Chat +5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • UltraLM 13B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Description

The Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT) framework exploits vulnerabilities in large language models (LLMs) by iteratively generating adversarial prompts. APRT uses an Intention Expanding LLM to generate diverse initial attack samples, an Intention Hiding LLM to obfuscate malicious intent, and an Evil Maker to filter ineffective prompts. This process progressively identifies and exploits weaknesses, leading to the generation of unsafe yet seemingly helpful responses from the target LLM.

Examples

See https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/APRT (opens in a new tab). The paper provides specific examples of successful attacks against Llama-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-4o, and Claude-3.5, resulting in unsafe outputs that appear helpful to a user. Examples are also shown in Figures 6 and 7 of the paper.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to elicit harmful or unsafe responses from LLMs, potentially leading to the generation of malicious code, dissemination of misinformation, incitement of violence, or other negative consequences. The framework's ability to transfer attacks from open-source to closed-source LLMs highlights a significant risk to the security of various LLMs.

Affected Systems

Large language models (LLMs), including but not limited to Llama-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-4o, and Claude-3.5. The vulnerability is likely to affect other LLMs as well, given the demonstrated transferability of the attack.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve LLM training data to better handle diverse and deceptive prompts.
  • Develop and deploy more robust safety mechanisms within LLMs to detect and reject malicious prompts.
  • Implement stricter content filtering and response validation processes.
  • Continuously monitor LLMs for new vulnerabilities and update mitigation strategies accordingly. Regular red teaming exercises are crucial.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large language models (LLMs), including but not limited to Llama-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-4o, and Claude-3.5. The vulnerability is likely to affect other LLMs as well, given the demonstrated transferability of the attack.

Research Paper

Automated progressive red teaming

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03876