The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Social Facilitation Jailbreak
The SoP framework allows for automated generation of jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms in LLMs. SoP utilizes multiple automatically optimized "jailbreak characters" within a single prompt to persuade the…
Paper-evaluated models(3)
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 7B Chat
Description
The SoP framework allows for automated generation of jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms in LLMs. SoP utilizes multiple automatically optimized "jailbreak characters" within a single prompt to persuade the LLM to generate harmful or undesirable content, even without any seed jailbreak templates. This vulnerability is demonstrated against GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and LLaMA-2.
Examples
See https://github.com/Yang-Yan-Yang-Yan/SoP (opens in a new tab). The repository contains the SoP framework and examples of automatically generated jailbreak prompts that successfully elicit harmful responses from various LLMs. A specific example showing a prompt and response is supplied in Appendix D of the paper.
Impact
Successful exploitation can lead to the generation of harmful, offensive, or illegal content by the affected LLM, potentially causing reputational damage, legal issues, and safety risks. The high success rate (88% against GPT-3.5-1106, 60% against GPT-4) highlights the severity.
Affected Systems
Large language models (LLMs), including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and LLaMA-2. Other LLMs with similar safety mechanisms may also be vulnerable.
Mitigation Steps
- Improve LLM safety mechanisms to better resist attacks that utilize multiple personas or collaborative narratives.
- Implement robust detection mechanisms to identify and block prompts employing the strategies used by SoP (e.g., multiple characters with specific instructions, affirmative prefixes).
- Regularly update and refine safety filters and guardrails based on new attack techniques.
- Employ a combination of detection-based and prompt-based defensive strategies. Thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of these defences against automated attacks, as existing techniques have shown to be insufficient.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Large language models (LLMs), including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and LLaMA-2. Other LLMs with similar safety mechanisms may also be vulnerable.
Research Paper
Sop: Unlock the power of social facilitation for automatic jailbreak attack
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.01902Related research
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